We use a human-subjects experiment to investigate how bargaining outcomes are affected by changes in bargainers' disagreement payoffs. Subjects bargain against changing opponents, with randomly drawn asymmetric disagreement outcomes that vary over plays of the game, and with complete information about disagreement payoffs and the cake size. We find that subjects only respond about half as much as theoretically predicted to changes in their own disagreement payoff and to changes in their opponent's disagreement payoff. This effect is observed in a standard Nash demand game and a related unstructured bargaining game, in both early and late rounds, and is robust to moderate changes in stake sizes. We show theoretically that standard models of expected utility maximisation are unable to account for this under-responsiveness, even when generalised to allow for risk aversion. We also show that quantal-response equilibrium has, at best, mixed success in characterising our results. However, a simple model of other-regarding preferences can explain our main results.
Introduction and background
Theoretical analysis of bargaining has, broadly speaking, proceeded along two lines. One line comprises the axiomatic bargaining solution concepts, such as those of Nash (1950) and Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) . This approach does not attempt to describe the detail of the bargaining process, but rather begins by listing a few desirable properties ("axioms") that the outcome of bargaining should satisfy. If these axioms are chosen carefully, they imply a unique outcome as the solution of any bargaining situation that satisfies a few weak conditions. The other line of research specifies the structure under which bargaining occurs (e.g., the sequence of proposals and counterproposals), and uses the tools of non-cooperative game-theory to find solutions. Some of the earliest work along this line was that of Nash (1953) , who proposed a non-cooperative game (now known as the Nash Demand Game, which we will abbreviate as NDG) in which two players simultaneously make demands, and where each player receives the payoff they demand if the demands are compatible; otherwise some default "disagreement" outcome is imposed. Axiomatic and non-cooperative game-theoretic analyses of bargaining situations can serve as alternative but complementary ways of understanding the outcome of the bargaining process. general, different techniques for analysing bargaining can yield different solutions, in this case they show a striking amount of agreement. The most prominent axiomatic bargaining solutions -the well-known Nash and KalaiSmorodinsky solutions as well as others such as equal-gain and equal-sacrifice -make identical predictions in this case: agreement on the (0.5, 0.5) outcome. In addition, (0.5, 0.5) is the unique symmetric efficient Nash equilibrium in the NDG, as well as the outcome implied by Harsanyi and Selten's (1988) notion of risk dominance, as well as their equilibrium selection criterion. Now suppose that Player 1's bargaining position improves, in the sense that her disagreement payoff increases from 0 to 0.5 and Player 2's remains unchanged. Then the new individually rational portion of the bargaining set S is the convex hull of (0.5, 0), (1, 0) and (0.5, 0.5) (see the right panel of Figure 1 ), and all of the well-known axiomatic bargaining solutions predict (0.75, 0.25) to be the outcome of this new bargaining situation. 1 Moreover, risk dominance, the Harsanyi-Selten selection criterion and (if the bargainers focus only on individually rational outcomes) the symmetric efficient Nash equilibrium also predict a shift from (0.5, 0.5) in a Nash Demand Game with the first bargaining set to (0.75, 0.25) in the second.
Thus, all of the most commonly used techniques for analysing bargaining agree on how players adjust to changes in the disagreement outcome (i.e., changes in their bargaining position). In the example above, the increase of 0.5 in Player 1's disagreement payoff, with no change to Player 2's disagreement payoff, led to an increase of 0.25 in Player 1's bargaining payoff, and a corresponding decrease of 0.25 in Player 2's payoff. More generally, given any bargaining set with this isosceles right triangular shape, a unit increase in one player's disagreement payoff is predicted to lead to an increase in that player's bargaining payoff of exactly one-half of a unit, with an equal-sized decrease in the other player's payoff.
Whether this theoretically ubiquitous property holds in real bargaining situations is, of course, an empirical question. The goal of this paper is to examine whether and how bargaining outcomes actually are affected by changes to players' disagreement payoffs. We accomplish this by means of a laboratory experiment, which allows us precise control over both the disagreement outcome and the total amount being bargained over (the "cake size"). For robustness, we use two bargaining games, both of which capture essential features of real-life bargaining. One is the NDG, described above. The other is an unstructured variation of the NDG, which we call the Unstructured Bargaining Game (UBG). In the UBG, the bargaining set is the same, but instead of making simultaneous demands, players are given a fixed amount of time to negotiate a mutually-agreed division of the cake. Both players can make proposals, and either player can accept any opponent proposal up until time runs out; the first accepted proposal is implemented. If no proposal is accepted, both players receive their disagreement payoffs. Also for the sake of robustness, we vary the stakes involved, with a small cake size of £5 and a large cake size of £20.
Our experiment is designed with several features that allow a thorough investigation of the effects of disagreement outcomes on bargaining behaviour. First, unlike most previous studies in which bargaining power was manipulated through only a few discrete values (see Section 3), our experiment has disagreement payoffs drawn randomly from nearly continuous distributions with roughly two thousand possible values. As a result, most subjects do not face the same disagreement outcome twice during the experiment. Second, unlike the only previous study that did vary disagreement outcomes over multiple values (Fischer, Güth and Pull, 2007 , discussed in some detail in Section 3), our experiment has the subject's own disagreement payoff drawn independently of the opponent's disagreement payoff, allowing us to distinguish between the effect of changes to one's own disagreement payoff and that of changes to the opponent's disagreement payoff.
Our main finding is that while subjects do take into account their bargaining position -in the sense that increases in one's own disagreement payoff, and decreases in the opponent's disagreement payoff, translate into higher bargaining payoffs -they are much less sensitive to changes in their bargaining position compared to the theoretical predictions described above. Specifically, both the own-and the opponent-disagreement-payoff effects are on the order of one-quarter, compared to the theoretically-predicted values of one-half. This result is robust to which bargaining game was played, as well as to changes in the cake size and in the ordering in which subjects faced the cake sizes, and is observed in both early and late rounds. We will show in Section 7 that this result cannot be explained solely by subjects' aversion to risk, and in Section 8 that quantal-response equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995) does better, but is also unsatisfactory. In contrast, we will show in Section 9 that other-regarding preferences 1 Thomson (1987) analyses how various axiomatic bargaining solutions vary with the disagreement outcome for general bargaining problems with two or more agents.
can account for our result: specifically, while Fehr and Schmidt's (1999) original model of inequity aversion cannot explain the result, a slight modification can. As we discuss in Section 10, however, other explanations for our results may also be possible.
The bargaining environment
We describe here the two-player bargaining problem underlying both games used in the experiment (see Figure 2 ). There is a fixed sum of money (a cake) of size M , and the set of feasible agreements is the set of non-negative pairs totalling M or less. The disagreement outcome -imposed if bargaining is unsuccessful -is asymmetric: the favoured player receives d f and the unfavoured player receives d u , with d f > d u > 0 and d f + d u < M . The values 
Nash demand game (NDG)
In the NDG, bargaining consists of a single pair of simultaneously made demands x f and x u by the favoured and unfavoured players, respectively. If the demands are compatible (x f + x u ≤ M ), then each player receives the amount demanded (any remainder is left "on the table"). If the demands are incompatible (x f + x u > M ), then both receive their disagreement payoffs.
The NDG is simple enough to be analysed by standard non-cooperative game theory, but the result is not a unique prediction. Rather, the game typically has a large number of Nash equilibria, including (1) efficient purestrategy equilibria with x f ≥ d f , x u ≥ d u and x f + x u = M , leading to equilibrium payoffs (x f , x u ); (2) inefficient pure-strategy equilibria with x f > M − d u and x u > M − d f and resulting equilibrium payoffs (d f , d u ); and (3) inefficient mixed-strategy equilibria with expected payoffs totalling less than M but more than d f + d u .
Equilibrium selection criteria such as payoff dominance or efficiency can reduce the set of equilibria somewhat, eliminating the inefficient equilibria in (2) and (3) above. If an additional symmetry criterion is imposed, with symmetry defined relative to the individually rational set, then the unique prediction is for the players to split the surplus evenly:
Theoretical predictions
The prediction of Nash equilibrium (with the additional assumptions of risk dominance, Harsanyi and Selten's selection criterion, or efficiency and symmetry) for the NDG, and the predictions of the well-known axiomatic bargaining solutions for the UBG -discussed in the previous two sections -therefore imply the same outcome. In all cases, the players receive their disagreement payoffs, then evenly share the remainder (the available surplus). 3 There is thus a sharp theoretical prediction concerning the relationship between the disagreement payoffs and the bargaining outcome in both games:
That is, an increase of £1.00 in a player's own disagreement payoff results in a £0.50 increase in that player's payoff resulting from bargaining, while an increase of £1.00 in the opponent's disagreement payoff results in a £0.50
2 See Simon and Stinchcombe, 1989; Reny, 1993, 1994; and de Groot Ruiz et al., 2010 for non-cooperative game-theoretic analyses of unstructured bargaining using additional assumptions. 3 This implication also coincides with that of the "split-the-difference" criterion for bargaining games with outside options (Binmore et al., 1998) . Binmore et al. find that split-the-difference does not characterise the data from their outside-option experiment as well as another criterion, "deal-me-out", according to which the favoured player receives the maximum of her outside option and 50% of the cake. Outside options differ from disagreement payoffs in that they have to be forgone in order to bargain (and are thus unavailable in the event of disagreement), so it is not obvious that the success of deal-me-out in an outside-option experiment has any implication for a disagreement-payoff experiment such as ours. However, the interested reader may note that as long as both disagreement payoffs are less than half the cake size, as they are in our experiment, deal-me-out implies that both players always split the cake equally, so that
decrease in that player's payoff from bargaining. We will sometimes refer to these as the own-and opponentdisagreement-payoff effects, respectively. The sum of their magnitudes should therefore be equal to one:
Related literature
While the NDG has the desirable feature of simplicity, one might criticise it as an excessive simplification of reallife bargaining. However, theorists have tended to defend it from this charge. Binmore (2007) points out that when bargainers can commit to demands, but neither has the ability to commit before the other, the NDG is the limiting case where both bargainers "rush to get a take-it-or-leave-it demand on the table first" (p. 496), resulting in simultaneous irrevocable demands. Moreover, Skyrms (1996) argues that in modelling the bargaining process, "
[o]ne might imagine some initial haggling...but in the end each of us has a bottom line" (p. 4); focussing on these bottom lines results in the NDG. Our use of the UBG, by contrast, admits the possibility that not all important aspects of bargaining are captured by these final demands.
The literature on bargaining experiments is immense, and a review, even focussing on games like the NDG and UBG, is far beyond the scope of this paper. (See, for example, Roth, 1995 and Camerer, 2003, pp. 151-198 .) Rather, we discuss the most closely related experiments to ours. Hoffman and Spitzer (1982) examined unstructured bargaining games with (in essence) a fixed, known cake size and one of two randomly chosen disagreement outcomes. Bargaining power tended to be very asymmetric; for example, in their "Decision 1", the two disagreement outcomes as portions of the cake were approximately (0.79, 0) and (0, 0.83). Hoffman and Spitzer found a substantial frequency of equal splits -irrespective of which disagreement outcome was chosen -even though this means that some bargainers accepted payments well below their disagreement payoffs. Hoffman and Spitzer's result may not have much implication for our experiment, however, as it is likely at least partly explained by their use of face-to-face bargaining, leading to a lack of subject anonymity. 4 More recently, Fischer, Güth and Pull (2007) examine bargaining in a variant of the NDG, where players simultaneously submit an ambitious demand x i and a (typically smaller) fallback demand g i . Players receive their ambitious demands if they total the cake size or less; if not, they each get their fallback demand if those total at most the cake size. If not, each receives their disagreement payoff d i (in our notation). Fischer, Güth and Pull were primarily interested in whether behaviour was similar between this game and an ultimatum game, but they also varied the disagreement outcome over eleven pairs: (0, 0.5), (0.05, 0.45), (0.1, 0.4), ..., (0.5, 0). Since disagreement payoffs are perfectly negatively correlated between opposing players, it is not possible to distinguish between responsiveness to own disagreement payoffs and responsiveness to opponent disagreement payoffs, but one can still compute the sum of these effects using their data. On average, the NDG results they report imply that |∂x i /∂d i | + |∂x i /∂d j | ≈ 0.38 and |∂g i /∂d i | + |∂g i /∂d j | ≈ 0.41. That is, subjects' demands increased as their bargaining position improved, but they were far from fully exploiting their bargaining power (which would imply sums equal to one). 5 4 Hoffman and Spitzer (1985) report similar results in another experiment, also with face-to-face bargaining. Their results also suggest that subjects become more willing to exploit a favourable bargaining position if instructions are written to specifically encourage subjects to do so (that is, they are told this is acceptable behaviour), and still more willing if favourable position is perceived to be earned, e.g., by scoring well on a test of cognitive skills. See also Gächter and Riedl (2005) for a bargaining experiment using a general-knowledge quiz to allocate the favoured and unfavoured player roles, and see Anbarci and Feltovich (2013) for an experiment where a real-effort task is used to determine disagreement payoffs.
5 Harrison (1987) also varies disagreement payoffs, but with perfect positive correlation between disagreement payoffs; his "Type 1 game" Binmore et al. (1991) considered the effect of varying bargaining power in a different game: an alternating-offer bargaining game similar to Rubinstein's (1982) . They varied how breakdown occurs (randomly or by a player's choice) and the disagreement payoff of one of the players, yielding four different subgame perfect equilibrium predictions. Subjects in their experiment were responsive to the changes in bargaining power that result from their treatment manipulations, but less so than theory predicts. Specifically, Binmore et al.'s results (see especially their Figures 2 and 3) suggest that a manipulation implying a one-unit increase in subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs will actually increase the subject's payoff by only two-thirds of a unit. There have also been studies looking at changes to bargaining power through aspects other than disagreement payoffs. These studies have tended also to find that subjects respond to changes in their bargaining position, but again, less so than theory predicts. 6 Unlike these previous studies, our experiment is designed specifically to measure responsiveness to changes in bargaining power. This gives our paper two advantages. First, previous studies that manipulated bargaining power have done so through a fairly small number of discrete values (e.g., two in Hoffman and Spitzer (1982) , four in Binmore et al. (1991) , eight in Ochs and Roth (1989) ); even Fischer, Güth and Pull (2007) used only eleven disagreement outcomes. In our experiment, disagreement payoffs are drawn from distributions with nearly continuous support (multiples of £0.01, between 5%-25% of the cake for the unfavoured player and 25%-45% for the favoured player). This means that most subjects face a different disagreement outcome in each of the forty rounds they played, and across all subjects, behaviour in response to thousands of disagreement outcomes can be observed. Second, unlike Fischer, Güth and Pull (2007) -the only other study of disagreement-payoff effects to use more than a few different disagreement outcomes -we vary the disagreement payoffs of both subjects in a bargaining pair independently, allowing us to disentangle the own-and opponent-disagreement-payoff effects.
We stress that the focus of our paper is the effect of disagreement payoffs on bargaining; our use of different games (NDG and UBG) and cake sizes (£5 and £20) is purely a robustness check. (In this, we follow Roth et al. (1991) , who varied stake sizes by a factor of three in some cells of their experiment, though their primary interest was in the effects of culture and the game played.) We note, however, that these other manipulations have served in previous work as research topics in their own right. Our NDG and UBG games roughly parallel Feltovich and Swierzbinski's (2011) "baseline" and "contracts" treatments, the former modifying the NDG by giving one of the players an outside option (which could be chosen in lieu of bargaining), and the latter adding a pre-play unstructured bargaining stage to this outside-option game. Feltovich and Swierzbinski found that when unstructured bargaining was possible, agreement frequencies were substantially higher, and agreements tended to be more favourable to the favoured player. There is also a fair-sized literature examining the effect of the cake size in bargaining, usually using ultimatum games, and taken together, they have yielded fairly consistent results. When subjects are given opportunities to learn through repetition, increasing the cake size raises the likelihood of a given demand (as a fraction of the cake) being accepted, and sometimes leads to higher demands (Slonim and Roth, 1998; Munier and Zaharia, 2003) , though even then, an increase on the order of 25 times seems to be needed for the differences to be discernible. On the other hand, no cake-size effect is typically discernible in one-shot games, even for quite large differences in cake sizes (Cameron, 1999) .
has a disagreement outcome of (0, 0), while in his "Type 3 game", both players receive equal positive payments in case of disagreement. 6 As an extreme example, Ochs and Roth (1989) varied discount factors and the number of stages in a finite alternating-offer bargaining setting, so that the first mover's predicted initial offer varied across cells from 16-60 percent of the cake, and found only a tiny effect on behaviour. Specifically, their Table 9 implies that even in the final round, a unit increase in a subject's predicted payoff was associated with only a 0.07-unit increase in observed payoff; the value of 0.07 is significantly different from zero (p ≈ 0.055), but quite small nonetheless.
Experimental design and procedures
Within a bargaining pair, roles were assigned randomly, so a given subject was equally likely to be the favoured or unfavoured player in any given round. 7 Disagreement payoffs were also randomly drawn in each round: uniform from 25% to 45% of the cake for favoured players, and uniform from 5% to 25% of the cake for unfavoured players (in both cases, rounded to the nearest £0.01). The cake size was £5 in one half of an experimental session and £20 in the other half (counterbalanced, to control for any order effects). Thus, disagreement outcomes, player type (favoured or unfavoured) and the cake size were varied within-subjects, while the ordering of cake sizes and the game played (NDG or UBG) were varied between-subjects.
Sessions took place at the Scottish Experimental Economics Laboratory (SEEL) at the University of Aberdeen. Subjects were primarily undergraduates from University of Aberdeen, and were recruited from a database of people expressing interest in participating in economics experiments, using the ORSEE software (Greiner, 2004) . No one took part in this experiment more than once, nor did anyone take part who had participated in any previous bargaining experiments at SEEL. Each session comprised forty rounds, twenty with each cake size; the repetition was intended less with a view to modelling the learning process (though we do allow for the possibility of learning in the regressions we discuss in Section 6.2), and more in order to give subjects an opportunity to improve their understanding of the strategic environment through gaining experience.
At the beginning of a session, subjects were seated in a single room and given written instructions for the first twenty rounds.
8 They were informed then that the experiment would comprise two halves totalling forty rounds, but details of the second half were not announced until after the first half had ended. The instructions were also read aloud to the subjects, in an attempt to make the rules of the game common knowledge. Then, the first round of play began. After the twentieth round was completed, each subject was given a copy of the instructions for rounds [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] . These instructions were also read aloud, before round 21 was played.
The experiment was run on networked personal computers, and programmed using the z-Tree experiment software package (Fischbacher, 2007) . Subjects were asked not to communicate with other subjects except via the computer program. Subjects were randomly matched in each round, with each other subject equally likely to be the opponent in a given round (a one-population matching protocol). No identifying information was given about opponents. Rather than using potentially biasing terms like "opponent" or "partner" for the other player, we used the neutral though somewhat cumbersome "player matched to you" and similar phrases.
Each round began with a screen telling each subject the cake size and both disagreement payoffs for that round. Draws for role and disagreement payoff were independent across rounds and pairs of subjects. After viewing their disagreement outcome, subjects in the NDG treatment were prompted to choose their demands, which could be any whole-number multiple of £0.01 between zero and the cake size inclusive. After all subjects had entered their demands, they received end-of-round feedback: own demand, opponent demand, whether agreement was reached (i.e., whether demands totalled at most the cake size), own payoff and opponent payoff. A subject's previous results were also collected into a history table at the top of the computer screen; these could be reviewed at any time. After all subjects clicked a button on the screen to continue, the session proceeded to the next round.
In the UBG cells, subjects were given a 90-second "negotiation stage" to reach agreement on a division of the 7 Thus, with extremely high probability, a subject plays some rounds as favoured player and others as unfavoured player. Some researchers (for example, Binmore, Shaked and Sutton, 1985) have found that giving subjects experience in both bargaining roles can mitigate otherregarding preferences, though Bolton (1991) found no difference between sessions with changing roles and those with fixed roles.
8 Sample instructions are shown in Appendix B. The remaining sets of instructions, as well as the raw data from the experiment, are available from the corresponding author upon request.
cake. Figure 3 shows a sample screen viewed by subjects during this time. Subjects could make as many or as few Figure 3 : Screen-shot from negotiation stage of UBG treatment proposals as they wished during the 90 seconds; a proposal consisted of a nonnegative multiple of £0.01 for the sender and one for the receiver, adding up to the cake size or less. There were no other constraints on proposals (e.g., there was no requirement that later proposals had to be more favourable to the receiver than earlier ones). Proposals could not be withdrawn once made, and no messages were possible apart from the proposals. 9 Both the subject's own proposals and the proposals of the opponent were shown on the subject's screen (in separate areas); it was not possible to view proposals for other pairs of subjects. As long as the negotiation stage hadn't ended, a subject could choose to accept any of the opponent's proposals, at which time that proposal would become binding.
9 Our prohibition of cheap talk, and the restriction of negotiation to computers rather than face-to-face interaction, were intended to maintain anonymity between bargainers in the experiment. This is important, as removing this anonymity opens up the possibility of sidepayments or threats outside the laboratory, after an experimental session has concluded. However, we acknowledge that lack of anonymity can be an important feature of some real bargaining situations. We also note that a side consequence of both of these design choices is they keep the level of social distance between the bargainers relatively high. Some research (e.g., Bohnet and Frey, 1999; Rankin, 2006) has found that decreases in social distance are associated with a greater prevalence of other-regarding behaviour.
The opponent's proposals were listed in order of increasing payoff to the subject, so there was almost no cognitive effort required to determine the most favourable opponent proposal (it was always at the bottom of the list), though subjects were free to accept less favourable proposals if desired. The negotiation stage ended if a proposal was accepted, if either subject in a pair chose to end it (by clicking a button on the screen), or after the 90 seconds had expired without an accepted proposal; in these latter two cases, the disagreement outcome was imposed. In either game, at the end of the fortieth round, the experimental session ended and subjects were paid, privately and individually. For each subject, two rounds from each block of twenty were randomly chosen, and the subject was paid his/her earnings in those rounds. There was no show-up fee. Subjects' total earnings averaged about £20. NDG sessions typically lasted about 45 minutes, UBG sessions about 90 minutes.
Hypotheses
As mentioned in Section 2.3, a player's payoff as a share of the cake size should increase by half of any change to her own disagreement outcome, and should decrease by half of any change to the opponent's disagreement outcome. We thus have the following null hypotheses (the corresponding alternative hypotheses should be clear):
Hypothesis 1 For each game, player type and cake size, a one-unit increase in a player's own disagreement payoff is associated with a one-half-unit increase in that player's payoff.
Hypothesis 2 For each game, player type and cake size, a one-unit increase in a player's opponent's disagreement payoff is associated with a one-half-unit decrease in that player's payoff.
Experimental results
The experiment comprised twelve sessions -three for each combination of game (NDG or UBG) and cake-size ordering (increasing or decreasing) -with a total of 164 subjects (varying from 10-18 in a session). We begin the analysis of results in Section 6.1 with descriptive aggregate statistics, followed by a brief look at more-disaggregated data, in order to examine how bargaining outcomes are affected by changes to the disagreement payoffs. Then, in Section 6.2 we use regressions to disentangle the effects of the disagreement payoffs from those of other variables.
In order to facilitate comparison of results with different cake sizes, we define a demand as a portion of the cake in the natural way: normalised onto a scale from 0 to 1 so that a zero demand corresponds to 0 and a demand of the entire cake corresponds to 1: demand as portion of cake = demand M .
We will do the same for other relevant variables (e.g., disagreement payoffs, payoffs resulting from an agreement).
Aggregate behaviour
Some aggregate data are presented in Table 1 . For each cake size (and for both pooled together, since there is so little difference between them), the table shows mean favoured and unfavoured player demands over all rounds of the NDG treatment, as a percent of the cake. Also shown are the mean payoffs to both player types conditional on agreement (by definition, identical to mean demands conditional on agreement) in both NDG and UBG. In the NDG, favoured players' demands average about 8% more of the cake (with only slight variation depending on the cake size) than unfavoured players' and their payoffs conditional on agreement are higher by about 7% of the cake in the NDG and about 15% of the cake in the UBG. Nonparametric statistical tests find that the differences between favoured and unfavoured players are significant (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, pooled cake sizes, p ≈ 0.016 for NDG demands and for payoffs conditional on agreement in both games), implying that favoured players benefit from their favoured status, and thus that subjects do exploit their bargaining power. 10 Also, the 15% figure for the UBG is significantly higher than either of its counterparts for the NDG (robust rank-order test, pooled cake sizes, p < 0.01 for UBG vs. either all demands in the NDG or demands given agreement in the NDG), so that favoured players exploit their bargaining position more under unstructured bargaining than under highly structured bargaining. However, all of the differences we observe between favoured and unfavoured players are substantially smaller than the approximately 20% average difference in the disagreement payoffs themselves (d f averages 34.8% and 35.1% in the NDG and UBG, respectively, compared to 15.3% and 15.0% for d u ). Thus, favoured players exploit their bargaining position less than predicted. . Then, for each of those three statistics, and for each of the 72 interval pairs, we plotted a circle whose radius is proportional to the number of occurrences in that interval pair (so that larger circles correspond to outcomes observed more often). Also shown in each panel are segments corresponding to equal splits of the cake and of the surplus, and a dotted least-squares trend line illustrating the observed association between bargaining position and bargaining outcomes.
As the figure shows, when neither player has a strongly advantageous position (d f − d u is low), approximately equal shares of the cake are most common, with most deviations in the direction favouring the player with the higher disagreement payoff. All three trend lines slopes upward, but less steeply than the segments corresponding to equal splits of the surplus, illustrating that as the favoured player's relative position improves (d f − d u increases), there is a tendency toward better outcomes for this player, but less so than theoretically predicted.
10 See Siegel and Castellan (1988) for descriptions of the nonparametric statistical tests used in this paper. Some critical values for the robust rank-order test were from Feltovich (2005) . We note that in implementing these tests, we err on the side of conservatism in two ways. First, we use session-level data rather than more disaggregated data, so that we ignore the information that can be gained by looking at individuals separately. (While individuals within a session should not be assumed to be independent of each other, neither are they perfectly correlated.) Second, we pool data from both cake sizes and both cake-size orderings; to the extent that these data are different in any systematic way, this will add a source of variance that will reduce the apparent significance of our test statistics.
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Parametric statistical analysis
We next use parametric methods to disentangle the effects of the disagreement outcome from other factors that might influence bargaining outcomes. We estimate Tobit models with the subject's demand (unconditional or given agreement) on the left-hand-side. Our primary explanatory variables are the own and opponent disagreement payoffs; additional right-hand-side variables are indicators for blocks of rounds (6-10, 11-15 and 16-20 for a given cake size, with 1-5 as the baseline), interactions between these block indicators and the own and opponent disagreement payoffs, and additional indicators for favoured player, £20 cake, and increasing cake size ordering. All of the models were estimated using Stata (version 11.2), used a constant term, and incorporated individual-subject random effects. Table 2 presents marginal effects (taken at means) and standard errors for each variable, and log likelihoods for each model. 11 Consistent with the descriptive statistics, demands are sensitive to both a player's own and the opponent's disagreement payoff, but less so than theoretically predicted. Instead of a £1 increase in one's own disagreement payoff leading to the predicted £0.50 increase in one's demand and payoff, the increase varies only from £0.20-0.29. Similarly, a £1 increase in the opponent's disagreement payoff should lead to a £0.50 decrease in one's demand and payoff, but the actual decrease varies from £0.17-0.30.
We note also that our other control variables have -for the most part -little effect on bargaining outcomes. This includes the favoured-player dummy, which is significant only in the UBG, suggesting that the differences between the types seen in Table 1 for the NDG can be explained by the sizes of their disagreement payoffs, rather than by being favoured or unfavoured per se. Also, cake size seems to have little effect, though this is not especially surprising in light of the fact that we vary it by a factor of only four; the ordering of cake sizes is never significant. Finally, the round-block dummies are usually insignificant as well as small in magnitude.
11 Our results are fairly robust. Additional estimations, not reported here, indicate that removing the last four right-hand-side variables in Table 2 , using linear instead of Tobit models, or replacing block indicator variables with the round number and its square does not materially affect the results. The top portion of Table 3 shows additional hypothesis test results, based on the Table-2 regressions. The first three rows show that in all three models, differences between the own-disagreement-payoff effect and +0.5, between the opponent-disagreement-payoff effect and -0.5, and between the sum of these effects' magnitudes and unity, are significant at the 0.1% level; thus we can reject Hypotheses 1 and 2. The next row shows no significant differences between own-and opponent-disagreement-payoff responsiveness (though the difference in NDG agreements approaches significance).
The bottom portion of this table shows marginal effects of the own-and opponent-disagreement-payoff variables in each individual 5-round block, also based on the Table-2 regressions; these can be used to get a sense of whether subjects are learning over time to exploit their bargaining power. In the NDG, by and large the answer is no; there is little systematic time trend from early 5-round blocks to later ones. In the UBG, a time trend is more apparent, with subjects becoming more responsive to both own and opponent disagreement payoffs over the first three blocks -though with that increase reversing in the last block. However, there is little statistical support for this apparent time trend: for any two adjacent blocks, there is no significant difference in marginal effects, nor can one reject the null hypothesis that the marginal effects in all four blocks -or even the first three -are equal (p > 0.10 in all cases), and even a comparison between the first and last blocks on their own shows only a weakly significant difference for the opponent-disagreement-payoff effect (p ≈ 0.056) and an insignificant difference for the own-disagreement-payoff effect (p > 0.10). Even ignoring the issue of statistical significance, it is clear from the table that even in the last 5-round block, own-and opponent-disagreement-payoff effects are still well below the theoretical predictions, and examination of time trends suggests that there is little reason to expect that subjects would have exploited their bargaining power more fully if the experiment had been extended for additional rounds.
7 Can risk aversion explain our main result? No.
One criticism that can be levelled at our design is that bargaining in our experiment takes place over money amounts, while bargaining theory involves utilities. Treating these as equivalent is akin to assuming that bargainers are risk neutral, whereas there is substantial evidence that people are actually risk averse (see Holt and Laury, 2002 , for evidence from a carefully designed experiment). Pure-strategy Nash equilibria (in particular the efficient equilibria, which include our prediction) are robust to assumptions about risk attitudes, as long as bargainers prefer more money to less. However, it is well known that predictions arising from axiomatic bargaining solutions such as the Nash solution are sensitive to risk preferences. Also, the mixed-strategy equilibria of the NDG change when risk attitudes change.
In this section, we examine the possibility that our main result, the under-sensitivity of bargaining outcomes to changes to disagreement payoffs, can be explained by relaxing the implicit assumption of risk neutrality: specifically, allowing bargainers to be risk averse. We will see that this is not the case; in fact, none of the commonly used classes of risk-averse expected-utility functions is able to explain this pattern of results.
Nearly all modelling of risk aversion uses one of two families of expected-utility functions: constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). We begin with CARA. The general form for a CARA utility function with risk aversion is u(x) = −e −αx , where x is the gain from bargaining and α > 0 is a risk-aversion parameter.
Proposition 1 If both bargainers are risk averse with (perhaps different) CARA utility functions, then the Nash bargaining solution implies
Proof: see Appendix A.
An immediate corollary (using the binding constraint x f + x u = M ) is that ∂xu ∂d f + ∂xu ∂du also equals 1. Proposition 1 tells us that even though the sensitivity to changes in own and opponent disagreement payoffs need not be + 1 2 and − 1 2 respectively, as they are under risk neutrality, their magnitudes still must sum to one. Thus the far lower sums in Table 2 (roughly 0.45-0.57) cannot be explained by risk aversion with CARA utility.
We move to CRRA, the most widely-used model of risk-averse preferences. The general form for CRRA is
where w is the individual's initial wealth, x is the gain from bargaining, and α > 0 is a risk-aversion parameter.
Proposition 2 If both bargainers are risk averse with (perhaps different) CRRA utility functions, then the Nash solution implies
Again, it immediately follows that ∂xu ∂d f + ∂xu ∂du ≥ 1. Proposition 2 is weaker than Proposition 1, with weak inequality replacing equality. However, the inequality is in the wrong direction for explaining our result, with the same implication as before: CRRA cannot account for the low values of ∂x f ∂d f and ∂x f ∂du we observe. 13 As a final step, we verify that the non-cooperative game-theoretic analysis is also essentially unaffected by relaxing the assumption of risk neutrality. As already mentioned, Nash equilibrium on its own doesn't make a unique prediction, so we concentrate on the Harsanyi-Selten (1988) criterion for equilibrium selection. For the NDG, this criterion selects the risk-dominant efficient outcome.
Proposition 3 If both bargainers are risk averse with (perhaps different) CARA utility functions, then the riskdominant efficient Nash equilibrium outcome corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution.
Proposition 4 If both bargainers are risk averse with (perhaps different) CRRA utility functions, then the riskdominant efficient Nash equilibrium outcome corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution.
12 In this section and in the next, we assume that the utility functions of the bargainers are common knowledge, as is typical in this literature (see, e.g., Kannai, 1977 or Roth, 1979 .
13 Similar methods to those used in the proof of Proposition 2 can be used to prove that when one bargainer has CARA utility and the other has CRRA utility, the result
∂du ≥ 1 continues to hold. In addition, numerical techniques suggest that this property holds for general continuous and concave utility functions.
Proofs: see Appendix A.
Thus, just as with the Nash bargaining solution, the Harsanyi-Selten criterion under CARA or CRRA preferences no longer implies that own-and opponent-disagreement-payoff effects are each one-half, but does imply that their sum is at least one (exactly one in the case of CARA). This means that even under risk aversion, the Harsanyi-Selten criterion cannot explain our experimental results. Moreover, it is straightforward to show that the Harsanyi-Selten outcome also risk dominates the inefficient Nash equilibria of the NDG, so that it is also the risk-dominant outcome; thus, risk dominance also cannot explain our results. 14 8 Can quantal-response equilibrium explain our main result? Not really.
Another plausible explanation for our results is bounded rationality. If bargainers don't fully maximise payoffs, but instead make occasional errors, these errors could push their behaviour in the direction of 50-50 splits, and thus make it less sensitive to changes in bargaining power. In this section, we will look at one of the most widely-used models of bounded rationality: McKelvey and Palfrey's (1995) quantal-response equilibrium (QRE). According to this model, players have correct beliefs about the play of their opponents, but rather than optimising given these beliefs, they choose pure strategies with a probability that is increasing in its expected payoff (given their beliefs). Here, we will give a short description of the most popular version of QRE -the logit equilibrium -applied to the NDG (see McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995 , for the general setup). 15 Let X be the set of pure strategies for each player (i.e., demands from 0 up to the cake size). Suppose the favoured player's beliefs about the unfavoured player's mixed strategy are given by ξ (i.e., she believes that the unfavoured player will choose his j-th pure strategy with probability ξ j ). Given these beliefs, calculate the favoured player's expected payoffs; let u f (x i ) be the expected payoff of her i-th pure strategy. Then the favoured player's mixed strategy is given by a logit-response function:
The parameter λ f is measure of the favoured player's payoff sensitivity: λ = 0 means that all pure strategies are equally likely, while as λ → ∞, her behaviour approaches best response. Similarly, if the unfavoured player's beliefs about the favoured player are given by π, and u u (x j ) is the corresponding expected payoff to his j-th pure strategy, then his mixed strategy is:
In a logit equilibrium, mixed strategies are given by these two logit-response equations, and both players' beliefs are correct: q = ξ and p = π. Clearly, the logit equilibrium strategies will depend on the values of λ f and λ u , and in general, λ may be different for different people. However, in our experiment, a subject's role is randomly drawn in each period, so each subject will play as both favoured and unfavoured player. Thus, on average we should expect that λ f = λ u , and we will denote their common value as λ. As Equations 1 and 2 indicate, finding exact logit equilibria requires solving a system of 2 · |X| non-linear equations (where |X| is the number of available demands), for each possible disagreement outcome and for each value of λ. Analytic solutions, as functions of these parameters, do not exist; hence, we present approximate logit equilibria that were obtained by numeric methods. To do this, we simplify the NDG by reducing the number of strategies to 21 for each player (multiples of 0.05 times the cake size, from zero to one) for each player, and we consider 4 disagreement outcomes (d f = 30% or 40% of the cake; d u = 10% or 20% of the cake). We used the Gambit game-theory software (McKelvey, McLennan and Turocy, 2007) to compute the logit equilibrium for each disagreement outcome; Gambit does not produce continuous analytic solutions, but rather large numbers of (λ, p, q) combinations, so that interpolation provides a reasonable approximation when logit equilibria for other values of λ are required. From these mixed strategies p and q, we can calculate the associated expected demands for each player (along with other quantities if desired, such as the probability of agreement). Comparison of these expected demands between two adjacent disagreement points yields approximations for the own-and opponentdisagreement-payoff effects. (E.g., comparing (0.3,0.1) and (0.3,0.2) yields an average own-disagreement-payoff effect for the unfavoured player and an average opponent-disagreement-payoff effect for the favoured player.)
The expected demands entailed by the logit equilibria of the four NDG games (i.e., for each of the four disagreement outcomes we consider) for a range of λ are shown in Figure 5 . The top four curves correspond to the favoured player's expected demands, and the bottom four curves to the unfavoured player's. Note one feature of these QRE: as λ → ∞, the logit equilbrium approaches the risk-dominant Nash equilibrium, so in one sense, the prediction of QRE is the same as the other solution concepts we have seen. For finite λ, on the other hand, many Figure 5 : Expected demands in QRE for four disagreement outcomes outcomes are possible, including some that may seem perverse. Importantly, QRE curves sometimes cross, meaning that the sign of the effect of moving from one disagreement outcome to another can flip as λ varies. For example, for λ between about 10 and 20, the unfavoured player actually demands less when his bargaining power improves (i.e., his opponent's disagreement payoff decreases) from d = (0.4, 0.2) to d = (0.3, 0.2). Also, for low values of λ, unfavoured players' expected demands are more than half of the cake size, and because favoured players do not lower their demands accordingly, expected disagreement rates are quite high in these cases (more than two-thirds for some λ when d = (0.4, 0.2) ).
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Corresponding disagreement-payoff effects are shown in Figure 6 . Again, as λ → ∞, both disagreementpayoff effects approach the standard theory's predictions of +0.5 and -0.5, while for finite λ, various outcomes are possible, with mixed implications for QRE's ability to characterise our results. On the one hand, it is clear that for Figure 6 : Own-and opponent-disagreement-payoff effects in QRE for four pairs of disagreement outcomes a given pair of adjacent disagreement outcomes, there exists a range of λ such that the own-disagreement-payoff effect is comparable to what we observed in the experiment, and there also exists an analogous range of λ for the opponent-disagreement-payoff effect. On the other hand, these ranges are an order of magnitude apart: on the order of 2-4 for the own-disagreement-payoff effect compared to 20-25 for the opponent-disagreement-payoff effect, depending somewhat on the particular pair of disagreement outcomes. Indeed, for values of λ implying an own-disagreement-payoff effect near +0.25, the corresponding opponent-disagreement-payoff effect is nearly zero in the four cases we consider, while for values of λ implying an opponent-disagreement-payoff effect near -0.25, the corresponding own-disagreement-payoff effect is well above the theoretical prediction of +0.5 in each case, and sometimes even greater than one! Additionally, for some disagreement outcomes, there is even a range of λ where the opponent-disagreement-payoff effect has the wrong sign, as was also apparent from Figure 5 .
Based on all of this information, we would conclude that quantal-response equilibrium has at best mixed success in characterising our results. For a given disagreement outcome and disagreement-payoff effect (own, opponent, or indeed the combined effect), there exists a value of λ consistent with the values seen in our experiment for that disagreement-payoff effect. However, in each case, the same value of λ will have additional implications that areif not perverse -at least different from our results in a qualitative sense.
Other-regarding preferences
If risk aversion and quantal-response equilibrium can't explain our results, what can? One possibility is that subjects have tastes for fairness that prevent them from making full use of their bargaining power, pushing outcomes toward 50-50 splits of the cake (as observed behaviour in dictator-game and ultimatum-game experiments seems to suggest; see Camerer, 2003, pp. 48-59 for a survey). There are now several models of such other-regarding preferences, and a full treatment of all of them is well beyond the scope of this paper. However, we examine in this section the ability of one particular model of other-regarding preferences to explain the observed undersensitivity of bargaining outcomes to disagreement payoffs. (See Section 10 for a discussion of what is learned from this exercise.)
We begin with Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , whose model of other-regarding preferences is probably the most widely used. Players have utility functions that depend on both own and opponent money payments. Specifically, in a two-player game, Player i's utility is given by
for i, j ∈ {f, u} with i = j, and with 0 ≤ β i < 1 and α i ≥ β i . The first term is the money payment itself; the second and third terms capture dislike for unfavourable inequality (relevant for the unfavoured player in our setup) and favourable inequality (relevant for the favoured player) respectively, with both linear in the magnitude of the inequality. Note that standard selfish preferences are obtained when α = β = 0.
Proposition 5 If both bargainers have (possibly different) preferences as given by Equation 3
, then the Nash bargaining solution implies
∂du is generically either 0 or 1.
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Intuitively, there are two possibilities. If the players dislike inequality greatly (α u or β f is relatively large) or if the disagreement outcome is fairly equitable (d f − d u is small), then the Nash solution yields an equal split, and
Otherwise, the favoured player gets strictly more than half of the cake, and
Thus, while the basic Fehr-Schmidt model can yield a value of
∂du less than one, it does not yield values like those seen in our experiment. In order to get these, we must alter the model slightly. We do this in two steps. First, normalise the cake size to unity, so that x f , x u , d f and d u can be interpreted as shares of the cake. 17 Second, make the disutility of unfavourable inequality convex in the magnitude of the inequality. 18 The new functional form is as follows:
16 Generically, because there is an additional knife-edge case where case also cannot characterise our experimental results, since we find that ∂x f ∂du is well above zero in all treatments. 17 We thus assume away the possibility of cake-size effects. We are reasonably comfortable in doing so, since we saw no evidence of them in our experimental data. We note that this normalisation is not necessary to explain the disagreement-payoff effects we observed. We also note that the original Fehr-Schmidt model, due to its linearity, would be unaffected by this kind of normalisation, so Proposition 3 will continue to hold.
18 This latter change is in the spirit of Bolton and Ockenfels's (2000) ERC model, though we do not adopt their additional assumptions of heterogeneity of preferences and incomplete information about these preferences. We also do not adopt their assumption of convex disutility of favourable inequity, which implies that individuals would prefer disagreement to extremely favourable divisions of the cake. Whether such preferences are common is, of course, an empirical question.
for i, j ∈ {f, u} with i = j, and with 0 ≤ α i , β i < 1. 19 We acknowledge that this modification is ad hoc, and that it treats favourable and unfavourable inequity asymmetrically. However, our desire is merely to show that a model of other-regarding preferences can account for our main results, and for this we use a model that has much of the flavour of Fehr and Schmidt's, has the same number of free parameters, and is simple enough to maintain some mathematical tractability. Obviously, if this simple variation explains our results satisfactorily, then there will be other, more complex, models that also do so. (For example, a continuity argument suggests that adding more free parameters so that both favourable and unfavourable inequity have linear-quadratic forms would yield another utility function that could also account for our results.)
As in the basic Fehr-Schmidt model, the Nash solution will yield either an equal split (in which case
is generically zero) or a division favourable to the favoured player. In this latter case, the sum of own-disagreementpayoff and opponent-disagreement-payoff effects is given by
where
An illustration of how Equation 5 depends on α and β is given by Figure 7 . Each panel shows, for a particular disagreement outcome, the region of the (α, β) unit square where Table 4 shows that corresponding divisions of the cake are also similar to typical divisions observed in the experiment. This table shows, for the three disagreement outcomes used in Figure 7 , the minimum and maximum value of x f implied by all parameterisations of our modified Fehr-Schmidt model that yield values of
equal to 0.4, 0.5 or 0.6 (i.e., the loci shown in Figure 7 ). Also shown are the corresponding mean observed payoffs for the favoured player (conditional on agreement), where the disagreement outcome was within 2.5 percentage points of the cake size for each player.
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As the table shows, this model has mixed success in characterising divisions of the cake. In only two of the six cases shown does the observed average favoured-player payoff fall into all three (or indeed any) of the corresponding intervals predicted by the model, though in the remaining cases, the observed average is just outside one of the 19 We are agnostic about the source of the parameters αi and βi. In particular, we are open to the possibility that their values vary not only across individuals, but also for the same individual across games, and perhaps depending on framing. We do make the implicit assumption that the values do not change for a given subject during the experiment, e.g., with experience or as a function of the realised disagreement payoffs. Even this might be assuming too much, since Binmore et al. (1991) found that subjects tended to report more favourable outcomes as being "fair" as their own bargaining position improved. If perceptions of fairness change systematically with the disagreement outcome, then values of αi and βi might do so as well. We also assume that these parameter values are common knowledge between the players, as we did in the previous section with risk-aversion parameters. One can relax this common knowledge assumption, as Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) did in their model of other-regarding preferences, though at the cost of some loss in tractability and possibly only by substituting a different common knowledge assumption (in Bolton and Ockenfels's case, of the distributions of parameter values in the population). 20 For example, the means for the column "(0.4, 0.1)" were calculated from the observations where the disagreement outcome gave shares in (0.375, 0.425) to the favoured player and shares in (0.075, 0.125) to the unfavoured player. endpoints. More importantly, the model yields qualitative implications like those observed in the data. Besides passing the consistency check that a higher distribution of favoured-player payoffs (in the sense that the right endpoint increases while the left endpoint is unchanged) corresponds to an improvement of the favoured player's bargaining position, the model also implies that values of α and β that yield higher sensitivity to disagreement payoffs also tend to yield agreements more favourable, in an absolute sense, to the favoured player (higher x f ). This last implication can also be observed in the data, as the UBG had both higher average favoured-player payoffs (shown in Table 4 ) and more sensitivity to disagreement payoffs (shown in Table 2 ) than the NDG.
Discussion and concluding remarks
The standard theoretical techniques used for analysing bargaining situations -both axiomatic solutions and noncooperative game-theoretic methods -make sharp, testable predictions for bargaining over a fixed, known cake with a known disagreement outcome. For each unit one's own disagreement payoff increases, or for each unit the opponent's disagreement payoff decreases, one's own payoff from bargaining increases by one-half of a unit.
We conduct a human-subjects experiment to test whether this property actually holds. Subjects play asymmetric bargaining games repeatedly against changing opponents, with disagreement payoffs chosen randomly in each round and independently for both subjects within a bargaining pair. Our design is novel, as there has been very little previous study of the effects of disagreement payoffs on bargaining outcomes, and (to our knowledge) none that attempts to disentangle the effects of one's own disagreement payoff from the effects of the opponent's disagreement payoff. Even other studies examining the effects of other ways of changing bargaining power have limited their consideration to a small number of discrete changes, in contrast to the almost continuous variation of own-and opponent-disagreement payoffs we implement.
Our main finding is that while subjects do exploit their bargaining position -in the sense that bargaining outcomes vary with the disagreement payoff in the direction predicted by the theory -the extent to which they do so is substantially less than predicted. This is true for both low (£5) and high (£20) stakes, for both orderings of stake sizes, for both bargaining games we use (NDG and UBG), and in both early and late rounds. Specifically, we find that a one-unit increase in a subject's disagreement payoff translates to an increase of only 0.20 units in that subject's demand in the NDG, while a one-unit increase in the opponent's disagreement payoff in that game translates to a decrease of only 0.17 units, in contrast to theoretical predictions of 0.5 units in both cases. Focussing on agreements gives broadly similar results: a unit increase in a subject's own disagreement payoff leads to payoff increases of 0.21 in the NDG and 0.29 in the UBG, while a unit increase in the opponent's disagreement payoff leads to payoff decreases of 0.17 in the NDG and 0.30 in the UBG. Even the higher magnitudes seen in the UBG are well below the theoretical prediction.
One common criticism of experiments where subjects bargain over money amounts (such as ours, as well as most other bargaining experiments including those of Hoffman and Spitzer, 1982 , Binmore et al., 1991 , and Fischer, Güth and Pull, 2007 , while Harrison, 1987 , used the binary lottery technique only in the event of agreement) is that axiomatic solutions and non-cooperative techniques deal with utilities, not money amounts, so that results that seem inconsistent with these solutions (applied to money amounts) might simply be showing that utility is not identical to monetary payments. However, we show in Section 7 that under either of the two widely used models of risk-averse preferences (constant absolute risk aversion or constant relative risk aversion), the (common) theoretical implication of the Nash solution, risk dominance, and the Harsanyi-Selten (1988) equilibrium selection criterion is almost as strong: while it does not imply that the magnitudes of the own-and opponent-disagreementpayoff effects are each 0.5, it still implies that their sum is at least 1. Hence, we conclude that our experimental results cannot be accounted for by subjects' risk aversion on its own. Another plausible explanation for our results -bounded rationality in the form of McKelvey and Palfrey's (1995) quantal-response equilibrium -is consistent with disagreement-payoff effects less than 0.5, as we show in Section 8. However, we also show in that section that quantal-response equilibrium has other implications that are at odds with our results.
Still another explanation for seemingly anomalous results in bargaining experiments involves other-regarding preferences; indeed, several such models have been developed at least partly in order to explain such results (e.g., Rabin, 1993; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) . While we show that Fehr and Schmidt's inequity aversion model is unable to account for our main result, we also demonstrate that a slight modification (in the spirit of Bolton and Ockenfels's model, though without many of this model's other features) can account for this result, and also implies divisions of the cake comparable to those we observed.
We would like to be very clear about what we can conclude as a result of this last exercise, and what we cannot. We have illustrated that a model of other-regarding preferences can explain our main experimental result: the relative unresponsiveness of subjects' behaviour to changes in their bargaining power. We do not claim that it is the only model of other-regarding preferences that can do so, though because our goal was merely to show that other-regarding preferences can explain the result, the possibility that other such models might also do so is beside the point. It is possible, though, that we've found the simplest model that does so. Furthermore, our finding that the basic Fehr-Schmidt model cannot explain our results should not be seen as "falsifying" their concept of inequity aversion. Our view of the contribution of their work is that it lies in their modelling of individuals as disliking both favourable and unfavourable inequity; the linear functional form they use is not an intrinsic requirement of inequity aversion, but rather a simplification that keeps the model mathematically tractable while allowing explanation of many empirical results. Since our variation maintains the model's essential features -only modifying the functional form slightly -we consider it to be merely an alternative specification, not a new model to be compared to the original one in some sort of "horse race".
Along the same lines, at risk of stating the obvious, we would point out that our finding that risk aversion does not account for our results is not an argument that people are not risk averse. It is easy to show, for example, that preferences that combine inequity aversion and risk aversion can also explain our results. All that we conclude based on Section 7 is that risk aversion is neither necessary nor sufficient.
Finally and most importantly, we emphasise that we make no claim that there aren't other alternative explanations for our results. Other explanations are possible, with some complementary to, or at least not mutually exclusive with, other-regarding preferences (and indeed, each other). For example, subjects may be reluctant to exploit a favourable position that they consider to be "unearned", due to being exogenously assigned. This might push outcomes toward 50-50 splits directly -through a failure to internalise the disagreement payments so that bargaining occurs over the entire cake rather than the the individually rational portion -or indirectly by strengthening other-regarding preferences (or both). 21 Bounded rationality might also push behaviour toward 50-50. We have seen that one such model -quantal-response equilibrium -cannot explain our results on its own, but either QRE in conjunction with another factor such as risk aversion, or a different model of bounded rationality, might have more success.
We would like to encourage experimenters to replicate our results and attempt to distinguish amongst the various alternative explanations. We would also like to encourage theorists, when constructing models involving bargaining, to consider whether the common technique of ignoring disagreement outcomes, through the normalisation of the bargaining set so that all disagreement payoffs are zero, is as innocuous as it's usually assumed to be.
A.2 Proposition 2: Nash solution under CRRA utility CRRA utility implies that utility functions can be written as u f (x) = 1 1 − α (w f + x) 1−α with α = 1, or u f (x) = ln(w f + x) for α = 1 u u (x) = 1 1 − β (w u + x) 1−β with β = 1, or u u (x) = ln(w u + x) for β = 1 with α, β > 0, and where w f and w u are their initial (non-negative) wealth levels. Demonstrating that
ddu ≥ 1 for all versions of CRRA requires breaking up the space of (α, β) pairs into nine subsets, according to whether α and β are greater than, less than or equal to one. Below are two of the cases; the others proceed analogously and are left out for space reasons, but can be obtained from the corresponding author upon request. Consider a different efficient Nash equilibrium (y f , y u ) = (x f − , x u + ), with > 0. The outcome (x f , x u ) risk-dominates (y f , y u ) in the NDG if it risk-dominates it in the 2x2 game determined by these two strategy profiles. Figure 8 shows this game, under the assumption that payoffs are identical to money payments. For risk-averse players, we must rewrite the game in terms of utilities. As in Proposition 1, suppose their utility functions are u f (x) = −e −αx and u u (x) = −e −βx , with α, β > 0. Then the true game is as shown in Figure 9 .
Unfavoured player x u y u Favoured x f (−e −αx f ,−e −βxu ) (−e −αd f ,−e −βdu ) player y f (−e −αy f ,−e −βxu ) (−e −αy f ,−e −βyu ) Figure 9 : CARA utilities in the 2x2 game formed by (x f , x u ) and (y f , y u )
The outcomes (x f , x u ) and (y f , y u ) are both strict Nash equilibria, so (x f , x u ) risk-dominates (y f , y u ) iff Proposition 2) risk-dominates any efficient Nash equilibrium away from 50-50. A proof for equilibria on the other side follows a similar process, and is available from the corresponding author. Consider a different efficient Nash equilibrium (z f , z u ) = (x f + , x u − ), with > 0. To show (x f , x u ) riskdominates (z f , z u ) in the NDG, it is sufficient to show that it risk-dominates it the 2x2 game shown (with money payments) in Figure 10 . For risk-averse players, we must rewrite the game in terms of utilities. As in Proposition 2, Unfavoured player
Figure 10: Money payments in the 2x2 game formed by (x f , x u ) and (z f , z u ) the proof from here varies slightly according to whether α and β are greater than, less than, or equal to one. We show the case where α < 1 and β < 1; the others are available from the corresponding author. For this case, we have u f (x) =
B Sample instructions
Below is the text of the instructions from our cell with the NDG and increasing cake sizes (first part and second part), followed by that from our cell with the UBG and decreasing cake sizes. Text in square brackets is added here for the reader's information, and was not in the original. To save space, horizontal lines are used instead of page breaks to indicate where each set of instructions begins. The instructions from the other cells are available from the corresponding author upon request.
---------------------------------------
Instructions: first part of experiment [NDG, increasing cake sizes]
You are about to participate in a decision making experiment. Please read these instructions carefully, as the amount of money you earn may depend on how well you understand them. If you have a question at any time, please feel free to ask the experimenter. We ask that you not talk with the other participants during the experiment.
This experiment consists of two parts, each made up of 20 rounds. These instructions are for the first half; you will receive instructions for the second half after this half has ended. Each round in this half consists of one play of a simple bargaining game, played between two people via the computer. In every round, you are randomly matched to another participant, with whom you will play this bargaining game. You will not be told the identity of the person you are matched with in any round, nor will they be told your identity -even after the end of the session.
The bargaining game is as follows. You and the person matched to you bargain over a £5.00 prize. You and the other person make simultaneous claims for shares of this prize.
-If your claims add up to the amount of the prize or less, you receive your claim, and the other person receives his/her claim.
-If your claims add up to more than the amount of the prize, you receive an "outside option", and the other person receives a different "outside option". These outside options are chosen randomly by the computer, and vary from round to round and from person to person. In each round, you and the person matched to you are informed of both of your outside options before choosing your claims.
Sequence of Play:
The sequence of play in a round is as follows.
(1) The computer randomly matches you to another participant, and randomly determines your outside option and the outside option of the other person. Your computer screen will display both your outside option and that of the other person. (2) You choose a claim for your share of the £5.00 prize. The other person chooses a claim for his/her share of the prize. Your claim can be any multiple of 0.01, between zero and 5.00 inclusive. Both of you choose your claim before being informed of the other's. (3) The round ends. You receive the following information: your own choice, the choice made by the person matched with you, your own payoff for the round, the payoff of the person matched with you. After this, you go on to the next round.
Payments: At the end of the experimental session, two rounds from this half will be chosen randomly for each participant. You will be paid the total of your earnings in those two rounds. In addition, there will be opportunities for payments in the second half of the session. Payments are made privately and in cash at the end of the session.
---------------------------------------
